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The Rise of China’s New-Type Think Tanks and the Internationalization of the State 
 
Jane Hayward, Tsinghua University and London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
China’s government is promoting new-type think tanks. These are often treated with scepticism by 
Western observers, due to their lack of independence from government and operation within a 
controlled intellectual environment. In this article, I heed recent calls by scholars to analyze think 
tanks, and how they develop, in their particular national political contexts. In China’s case, this is a 
powerful one-party state undergoing internationalization: usually understood as increased foreign 
exchanges, engagement with international institutions, and rising influence globally. In contrast, I 
view internationalization as the reorganizing of China’s state institutions and social structure in 
order to integrate with the global capitalist system. Through these processes, China’s policymaking 
community is converging with a powerful transnational class aligned with global capitalist interests. 
Think tanks are implicated in these processes, and are therefore involved in shaping capitalist class 
dynamics within China. This is a cause for concern and debate among policy makers, regarding 
“civil” think tanks in particular, which are non-governmental and privately funded. Drawing on 
interviews with Chinese think-tank scholars, and examining policy debates on the development of 
think tanks in Chinese academic and policy journals, I argue that the sphere of think tanks has 
become an important site of political contestation concerning China’s internationalization and the 
impact of class power on national policy making. Western observers, too often viewing 
independence as the key criterion for evaluating China’s think tanks, miss the significance of these 
debates. The relations between think tanks and government institutions must be understood in this 
political context.  
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Introduction 
 China’s think tanks have experienced a boom in recent years. Their number, organizational 
types, sources of funds, and overall prominence in policy making have increased dramatically. The 
central government plans to identify and approve fifty to a hundred “new-type” think tanks by 2020, 
which will receive special recognition by the Party Central Committee. Their role is to serve the 
government by “promoting scientific and democratic decision making, promoting modernization of 
the country’s governing system and ability, as well as strengthening China’s soft power.”1 Many 
Western observers are sceptical of Chinese think tanks, which are typically criticized for their lack 
of independence from government and the fact that they operate within a controlled intellectual 
environment. The assumption underlying such statements is that think tanks which are more 
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“independent”—usually a reference to private funding—will better be able to represent the interests 
of society against the state. In this article, I advocate that China’s think tanks should be taken 
seriously on their own terms. I address the following questions: Why is the Chinese government 
promoting new-type think tanks? And how is their development, and the role they play in policy 
making, being shaped by the social and political context in which they are situated?   
This is, in part, a response to the need—now well-recognized by think-tank scholars—to 
examine the national political cultures within which think tanks operate. This is not simply to 
address the fact of China being a one-party state, the usual starting point for analysis. Perhaps 
paradoxically, the national political context is intricately bound up with China’s integration into the 
global capitalist system. Thus, the central government’s promotion of think tanks forms part of the 
process by which China is becoming increasingly globally interconnected. Widely referred to by 
scholars as China’s “internationalization,” this is usually understood in terms of increased 
international exchanges, promoting China’s image on the world stage, strengthening China’s voice 
in global policy making, and engagement with foreign and international institutions.2 I build on 
these accounts to examine the class implications of China’s internationalization. As China’s policy 
advisors merge with the transnational class of experts and technocrats by which the world capitalist 
order is governed and managed, powerful groups within China have emerged which are allied to 
international capital. Chinese academics and policy makers well recognize the impact of this on the 
development of think tanks, and the issue has become a prominent topic of debate. New-type think 
tanks have thus become, I argue, sites of political contestation concerning the influence of capital, 
both domestic and global, on China’s state apparatus. Their development, including their 
relationship to government institutions, is being shaped through these contested processes. 
 English-language scholarship on Chinese think tanks has burgeoned in recent years. Recent 
studies research think tanks in particular sectors,3 or the policy communities which emerged around 
certain prominent issues or debates.4 Other studies examine individual think tanks, documenting 
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their development over time, or key moments in their history.5 A growing body of English-
language scholarship by Chinese scholars largely examines institutional issues, different 
organizational types and strategies, and the structural and personnel changes taking place as China’s 
think tanks rise in stature and influence.6  
 Scholars of think tanks, sensitive to their Anglo-American origins while cognizant of their 
burgeoning internationally since the 1990s, recognize the need to analyze their particular national 
political and cultural contexts.7 To this end, recent work has deployed the theoretical perspectives 
of global assemblages,8 and knowledge regimes.9 This latter approach uses typologies to identify 
different types of regime, examining the organizational and institutional machinery by which ideas 
are produced, their changes over time, and how these relate to the respective national political 
economies more broadly. The approach has been applied to China to escape the Anglo-American 
bias that previously affected much of the scholarship.10 Silvia Menegazzi’s account, in particular, 
combines a knowledge regimes perspective with Diane Stone’s concept of the global agora to 
analyze how Chinese think tanks function in the sphere of transnational policy making.11  
 The account presented here builds on existing scholarship in two ways. First, rather than 
providing an institutional or historical analysis, I heed Diane Stone’s call to examine the “sources of 
power of these organizations, and how they garner and wield societal and policy influence.”12 
Second, since I am concerned with the development of think tanks within the context of China’s 
integration with global capitalism, I deploy the theoretical perspective of the internationalization of 
the state, drawing the analytical focus towards how China’s new-type think tanks are implicated 
within emerging constellations of capitalist class power operating both within and beyond the 
nation-state. 
 While researching this article, I spent three years as a postdoctoral researcher at a leading 
think tank in Beijing, where I gained on-the-ground insights into the world of Chinese policy 
making. I held numerous discussions with think-tank scholars and policy makers, both within my 
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home institution, and in other prominent Chinese research institutions. These discussions included 
informal conversations with colleagues, as well as more formal, semi-structured interviews, which I 
conducted with scholars at university think tanks, and government research institutions. Some 
interviewees’ names and institutions are withheld by mutual agreement to maintain confidentiality.  
The article is organized into six parts. First, I discuss how China’s new-type think tanks are 
often treated with scepticism in Anglo-American media. This derives from traditional assumptions 
about think tanks within liberal democracies, and simplified conceptions about policy making in 
China’s “authoritarian” state. Challenging these underlying assumptions opens up space for more 
nuanced analysis of how Chinese think tanks operate. Second, I discuss how Chinese scholars and 
policy makers explain the purpose and role of new-type think tanks, and how traditional 
conceptions of think tanks are being re-evaluated for the Chinese context, in particular the notion of 
independence. Third, I introduce the theoretical concept of the internationalization of the state, 
focusing on issues pertaining to the restructuring of society and state institutions, and the 
transformation of class dynamics, as the nation-state accommodates to the requirements of the 
world capitalist economy. This provides important insights into the social and political environment 
in which China’s think tanks operate. Fourth, I discuss how the field of Chinese policy making has 
been internationalized throughout the reform period, aligning with the requirements of global 
capitalism through both social and discursive transformations. Fifth, rather than focusing on how 
“internationalized” policy makers are promoting China’s interests on the world stage, I instead 
examine how new-type think tanks are a means for policy makers to further integrate with the 
transnational technocratic class, the global technocracy, which oversees how the world economy is 
governed and managed. Think tanks are therefore implicated in the strengthening of capitalist class 
dynamics within China. Sixth, I examine how this issue is being debated within China, regarding 
civil think tanks in particular, which are privately funded. I argue that the sphere of think tanks is an 
important site of political contestation concerning China’s internationalization and the impact of 
5 
 
class power on national policy making. In a brief conclusion, I raise a number of questions which 
warrant further study.  
 
China’s Think Tanks Conundrum  
It appears paradoxical that China’s central government is promoting think tanks while re-
exerting ideological discipline within the Party, and within research institutes.13 This contradicts 
the principle of free and public exchange of ideas generally considered necessary for think tanks to 
flourish. Unsurprisingly, recent accounts by journalists and pundits are sceptical of Chinese think 
tanks. A typical example appeared in The Economist: 
[T]ruly independent think-tanks are not something the Communist Party really wants—they 
are a feature of civil society as liberal democracies define it, not as the party defines it ... 
Those “think-tanks” with the most influence in China do not write for the public but for a 
much smaller audience … They are trusted instruments of the Communist Party and the 
state ... The biggest danger of this emperor-advisor relationship is that it rewards advisors who 
tell the emperor what they already think[.]14  
 
This account rests on two problematic sets of assumptions. The first is a traditional understanding 
of what think tanks should be, derived from their Anglo-American origins: independent from 
government, operating within a free marketplace of ideas, and embedded within civil society.15 The 
second is an understanding of the Chinese party-state as a closed, unitary entity from which policy 
decisions emanate top-down. China’s think tanks are thus portrayed in somewhat orientalist terms 
as authoritarian, pseudo others against an ideal type represented by liberal democracies. This 
obviates rigorous analysis of how they actually operate.16 Once both sets of assumptions are 
critiqued, a more nuanced account becomes possible.  
First, according to Thomas Medvetz in his study of think tanks in the US, think tanks must 
endeavour to foster political influence, secure funding, garner publicity, and maintain a creditable 
scholarly reputation. The requirement to cater to all four at once “powerfully limit[s] think tanks 
capacity to challenge the unspoken premises of the policy debate, to ask original questions, and to 
offer policy prescriptions that run counter to the interests of financial donors, politicians, or media 
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institutions.”17 Indeed, some think tanks deliberately perpetuate the discourse of independence 
while cultivating political connections behind the scenes.18 RAND, for example, a US government-
backed defence think tank, was transformed into a non-profit corporation to disguise its close 
connections with the Air Force.19 Ethnographical research on the formation of British healthcare 
policy shows how think tanks worked backstage to build ties with government ministers and 
corporate donors not only to get their ideas heard, but to establish what ideas would be palatable to 
government officials. The healthcare debate thus took place largely behind closed doors without 
public consultation.20 Such studies demonstrate that the supposed free marketplace of ideas is 
constrained by the political topography of the day even in Anglo-American democracies, while the 
notion of think tanks as located within civil society and representing the interests of the public, as 
opposed to the state, is ambiguous at best. 
Second, while this account implies a unitary state with decisions emanating from above, studies 
of the mechanisms of Chinese policy making demonstrate that, in fact, it involves processes of 
contestation taking place both inside and outside the state apparatus. The fragmented 
authoritarianism model, for example, emphasizes the importance of negotiations and bargaining 
between competing bureaucracies and localities within the government structure. This is to achieve 
a centralized set of policy guidelines which are then implemented in various ways by different 
branches and regions.21 Xufeng Zhu’s work demonstrates how regional government think tanks and 
private policy entrepreneurs, both of which have limited access to the central institutions of power, 
have managed to influence national policy making at the highest levels by capturing media attention 
and mobilizing public support.22 Jessica Teets’ model of consultative authoritarianism shows how 
state institutions strategically collaborate with civil society organizations, often able to deploy their 
own sources of funding, in order to solve various social problems.23 These analyses demonstrate 
that there is scope for think tanks to have a meaningful role in policy making, both inside and 
outside government institutions. Why, then, are China’s leaders promoting think tanks now, and 
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what role will they play?  
 
China's New-Type Think Tanks  
 Scholars within regular government research institutions are skilled at gathering data and 
drafting political speeches, but not trained at sophisticated interpretation or proposing new 
strategies.24 Instead, the bureaucracy was designed with conformity in mind. Government 
researchers are unwilling to risk losing promotion opportunities by suggesting unconventional ideas, 
while rigid controls on staff numbers obstruct efforts to bring in new recruits with fresh ideas.25 
New ideas are “stovepiped,” passed upwards to superiors within institutions, rather than exchanged 
for debate with scholars outside.26 This insularity is conducive to institutional conflict, with 
different ministries competing for influence and central budget funds instead of offering 
disinterested policy advice.27 With China’s growing role in world affairs, and the blurring of 
domestic and international policy boundaries requiring more complex forms of analysis, this system 
is no longer considered adequate.28 Officials have expressed frustration that in international 
deliberations, particularly with the US, Chinese negotiators are repeatedly outwitted by their 
counterparts with better trained advisers.29  
 China’s new-type think tanks are to consist of full-time, professional, specialized researchers, 
in order to provide a more sophisticated community of experts. Broadly speaking, there are three 
main types. Official think tanks are government institutions, semi-official think tanks are set up by 
government institutions and managed by state-approved personnel, while civil thinks tanks are non-
governmental and mostly privately funded.30 There is no fixed model, however. University think 
tanks, for example, are sometimes called “civil” despite being housed within larger official 
institutions, and are funded by a mixture of private endowments, government funds, and 
contributions from the host university’s foundation. The list of the first twenty-five nationally 
approved new-type think tanks was released in December 2015.31 These are to be affiliated to the 
8 
 
Central Propaganda Department, through which their uncensored reports will be transmitted directly 
to the top leadership, receiving special priority within the relevant bureaus. This is designed to 
diversify and accelerate the channels of expertise into central policy making.   
Such think tanks cannot be dismissed due to their institutional connections to government. As 
James McGann and Kent Weaver acknowledge, “in countries where sponsorship by a government 
ministry is a legal necessity for a think tank to exist, excluding organizations with an organizational 
link to government would convey the misleading impression that those regions host no think tanks 
at all.”32 Indeed, the growing importance of Chinese think tanks is internationally recognized, with 
China listed as having 435 think tanks—the second highest number in the world—in the reputable 
Global Go To Think Tank Index.33 As such, China’s think-tank scholars have been making efforts 
to re-evaluate the term “independence.” Xufeng Zhu argues that think tanks should be regarded as 
independent if they constitute an “independent legal personality” which determines that they work 
to serve the public interest, rather than a parent company—whether a government institution or a 
private corporation.34 Angang Hu, head of the Institute for Contemporary China Studies (ICCS) at 
Tsinghua University, one of the first twenty-five national new-type think tanks, proposes that 
independence be determined by three criteria: autonomy in selecting topics of research, autonomy 
in conducting research, and the ability to publish independently.35 Under the current system, a list 
of over one hundred “commissioned topics” (weituo keti) is compiled from various government 
bureaus which think tanks have discretion to choose from. Research on commissioned topics cannot 
be published openly without permission, but think tanks can pursue their own research separately.36   
Hu argues that within Chinese political culture the interests of the government and the public 
are not considered separate as in liberal democracies, therefore the conceptual problem of think 
tanks serving the government rather than civil society does not arise.37 A number of think-tank 
scholars I interviewed stated that the confidentiality of exchanges between scholars and officials 
enables criticisms to be made freely. According to one interviewee, Chinese leaders have privately 
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urged think tanks to be forthright in their criticisms for the good of the Party—criticisms that could 
not be made openly.38 Another high-profile scholar told of how he had entreated top leaders to rein 
in corruption within the Politburo. While subsequent events appear to show these recommendations 
were heeded, had they been made openly they would have been regarded as a personal attack on the 
leadership, and publicly discredited.39 
 
The Internationalization of the State  
Analyzing think tanks in their national context is therefore necessary. Yet, in today’s integrated 
world it no longer makes sense to analyze policy making as contained within national borders.40 
Scholars have long examined how policies are transferred, or diffused, between nation-states, 
through processes of convergence or learning, for example.41 Many such studies, however, are 
vulnerable to the critique of “methodological nationalism,” comparing nation-states as bounded, 
sovereign units.42 Other analyses examine how multiple institutions, at both national and 
international levels, operate across borders to form epistemic communities, or knowledge networks, 
to influence global policy.43 Think tanks are adept operators in this respect, with “their multiplicity 
of tailored narratives and capacity to adapt quickly in different argumentative and institutional 
fields.”44 China’s leaders’ promotion of think tanks as part of their international strategy is 
therefore unsurprising.  
The field of transnational policy making is not neutral, however. As institutions ally and 
compete to determine which kinds of knowledge become hegemonic, “ideas backed with power … 
are most likely to be influential.”45 In a capitalist world economy, policy ideas which achieve 
dominance tend to reflect the requirements of global capital.46 A body of scholarship of particular 
insight here highlights how “globalization” is constituted not just at the global, or transnational 
level, but also by multiple processes “oriented towards global systems and agendas” occurring deep 
within nation-states themselves.47 This includes forms of institutional, social, and spatial 
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restructuring as the state, “at once the subject and the object of the globalization process,” 
transforms to accommodate to the requirements of international capital.48  
As recounted by Robert Cox, first, a consensus is formed between nation-states concerning the 
requirements of the world economy. This takes place “within a common ideological framework (i.e., 
common criteria of interpretation of economic events and common goals anchored in the idea of an 
open world economy).”49 Participation is hierarchically structured, with the US dominating in 
recent decades by the successful promotion of an ideology grounded in neoclassical economics.50 
In the under-represented nations, implementation is made possible “by people who have been 
socialized to the norms of the consensus”—that is, by local staff who likely graduated from the 
universities of advanced capitalist countries, or held posts at major international financial 
institutions.51 This international cohort, while containing many internal conflicts—not least 
differing national loyalties—is allied in its commitment to securing the needs of international 
capital.52 This amounts to a global technocracy: a powerful class of managers and experts whose 
role is to negotiate and facilitate the policies of the global ideological consensus. This technocracy, 
significantly, is not subject to democratic accountability. Rather, these “[l]ocal technocratic 
elites … bypass the formal channels of government and other social institutions subject to popular 
influence.”53  
 At the national level, the state itself, consisting of an ensemble of institutions, is conceived as a 
structural apparatus which mediates how social forces within the nation-state interact and compete 
for control of government institutions. As such, it is “shot through with many class antagonisms and 
struggles.”54 A state which is internationalizing, in this perspective, is one where those class forces 
aligned with the interests of international capital have achieved dominance. The internal structures 
and institutions of states are then adjusted “so that each can best transform the global consensus into 
national policy and practice.”55 Authority is delegated to both subnational and supranational levels 
for the purposes of promoting processes of capital accumulation.56  
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The internationalization of the Chinese state thus concerns the transformation of China’s 
institutional, spatial, and social structure to accommodate to the needs of the global capitalist 
economy. This includes regulating finance and taxation, determining property rights, producing a 
land market and an army of mobile, low-cost workers, and inculcating an ideology conducive to 
maintaining a stable, compliant population while these social upheavals take place.57 These 
processes, always resisted, are shaped by ongoing contestations within state institutions, and 
through alliances with—or opposition from—social forces outside the state apparatus. This has 
been witnessed in China through the many cases of activism and protest around workers’ rights and 
rural land expropriations, for example.58 It is also evident in disagreements over policy making, 
such as the debates concerning the privatization of rural land, which remains under collective 
ownership.59 This issue is highly controversial in China, where privatization is viewed by many as 
a licence for corporations to ride roughshod over peasant property rights. Importantly, these 
contestations are not nationally contained, the designs of global capital on China’s rural land being 
a case in point.60 The second half of this article examines how China’s internationalization is 
shaping the development of think tanks.  
 
The Internationalization of Chinese Policy Making 
Chinese policy making has been internationalizing throughout the reform period via a set of 
distinct, mutually reinforcing social and political transformations. These occurred in part due to 
influence and funding—encouraged by Zhao Ziyang and other reformist leaders—from the IMF and 
the World Bank, as well as other overseas organizations such as the Ford Foundation and various 
American universities, which provided training programs, workshops and seminars, joint research 
projects with foreign economists, and trips overseas, including for the undertaking of PhDs at 
Western universities.61  
 First, the number of scholars studying abroad, particularly in the US, rose dramatically. The 
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Chinese government expended efforts to encourage their return following their studies.62 Overseas 
PhDs were considered preferable by many employers, and scholars were attracted back by the 
greater prestige and higher salaries. According to the Ministry of Education, from 1978 to 2007, 
1.21 million students and scholars studied abroad, of whom 319,700 returned.63 They were posted 
to top institutions, including leading universities in Beijing, the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, the Rural Policy Research Office, the Ministry of Finance, and the Bank of China. Zhao 
Ziyang and others drew on these communities of Westernized experts to promote China’s opening 
to the global economy, overcoming voices of opposition within the state bureaucracy.64 While the 
thinking among these returnee academics was not monolithic, one significant development was an 
intellectual uncoupling of foreign trade from the concept of exploitation, and a positive 
reassessment of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage compatible with the ideologies 
underpinning globalization.65 
 Second, fundamental changes occurred in official state policy discourse, such that it became 
compatible with the neoclassical or neoliberal discourses characteristic of the global ideological 
consensus. This included a rejection since the 1980s not just of the Marxist theories of class 
struggle, but of the language of “class” itself, in favour of the Weberian discourse of “social strata.” 
This was a strategy to inoculate against fledgling working-class movements just as an army of 
migrant workers was emerging. Reminiscent of the disappearance of class analysis from academia 
in 1980s Britain and America, China’s working class was rendered “inarticulate,” facilitating the 
political conditions for its subordination to the interests of global capital, which increasingly 
dominated the landscape.66  
Third, the Chinese government embraced scientific expertise and sought to recruit technocrats 
into the bureaucracy at all levels.67 This was a deliberate strategy following the turbulent years of 
the Cultural Revolution to produce a politically stable environment of managers and problem 
solvers conducive to economic development. It was accompanied by a turn towards scientific 
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analysis in policy making, presaged by Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on “seeking truth from facts” 
and later enshrined in the “scientific development concept” under Hu Jintao. Along with the 
expulsion of class, this operated to depoliticize—and remove all traces of Marxism from—Chinese 
policy discourse. The parallels with the turn to scientific expertise in the US from the 1950s are 
striking.68 Those efforts were led by the RAND Corporation, which was established in the US 
during the Cold War to produce theories and ideas to combat, and undermine, Marxism and 
socialist politics more generally.69  
 Fourth, a close alliance formed between this new technocratic class and an emerging 
entrepreneurial class,70 forming “a crooked fusion of marketization and bureaucratization” oriented 
towards capital, particularly international capital.71 These entrepreneurs, many of whom are also 
overseas-trained returnees,72 have been asserting their political interests by funding think tanks, and 
taking managerial roles within them. The China Center for International Economic Exchanges 
(CCIEE), for example, another of the first twenty-five national new-type think tanks, is a 
membership organization counting many leading entrepreneurs among its members, including from 
multinational companies, and has several top CEOs as vice chairs.73 It is funded largely from their 
membership fees and donations.74  
  
China Joins the Global Technocracy  
The new-type think tanks which have emerged in this internationalized policymaking field play 
an important role in transmitting the global ideological consensus into Chinese policy circles, 
aligning China’s internal policy making with its requirements, while adapting it for China’s national 
conditions. The work undertaken by Angang Hu and scholars at the ICCS, for example, contribute 
to these processes. Hu conducted postdoctoral research at the Department of Economics at Yale in 
1991, and at the Centre for International Studies at MIT in 1998. He regularly recruits scholars for 
the ICCS with graduate training from leading UK or US institutions. These scholars produce reports 
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for China’s top leaders summarizing and explaining the publications of major international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the UNPD, and interpreting their significance for China. As 
high-level consultants in the drafting of China’s national Five-Year Plans, they then seek to 
incorporate and adapt the principles contained in these international publications into working 
policies within China.75 
Hu regards promoting internationally recognized development standards within China as part 
of his role. In 2009, the ICCS teamed up with Brookings to push for an agreement between US and 
Chinese leaders on climate change at the Copenhagen summit. The ICCS compiled an internal 
report attempting to persuade China’s leaders that the new Obama administration was sincere in its 
intentions to cooperate, and calling on them to heed their recent Olympic slogan, “one world, one 
dream,” but the endeavour was not successful.76 More recent work has involved transmitting to 
China’s leadership the significance of the core criteria of the Human Development Index. Although 
the ICCS does not directly seek funding from international organizations, Hu believes his institute 
benefits both through working with them on collaborative projects, and from having access to their 
databases and reports free of charge, particularly those of the World Bank, the WTO and the WHO, 
which the ICCS draws on regularly in producing its own reports. Hu also routinely gives reports 
and presentations on Chinese policy matters to conferences and high-level meetings at international 
institutions, and understands his think tank as a two-way “bridge” between China and those 
involved in global policy making.77 
Another prominent example of how Chinese policy makers are joining the global technocracy 
is the career trajectory of economist Justin Yifu Lin. Lin is a professor at Peking University, and 
one of the vice chairs of the CCIEE. He received his PhD from Chicago University, renowned for 
its promotion of neoclassical economics. He played an important role in the WTO debates, 
persuading more conservative leaders of the benefits of opening China’s domestic economy to 
international market competition.78 He was chief economist and senior vice president of the World 
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Bank from 2008 to 2011. He was a founding faculty member in 1994 of the influential think tank 
China Center for Economic Research (CCER) at Peking University, where he helped to redesign the 
economics curriculum to be “more in line with the American model, particularly the “Chicago 
model.””79 In 2008 the CCER became the National School of Development (NSD). In 2013 it was 
listed in the top five think tanks in the category of “highest professional influence” in the national 
rankings compiled by the Think Tank Research Center of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 
the first of its kind in China.80 In 2015, the NSD was named one of China’s national new-type think 
tanks. According to the NSD’s website, it seeks to provide research for “China’s national 
development and [the] new global order.”81 Within the NSD, Lin heads the Center for New 
Structural Economics (CNSE). This promotes a new framework for economic development rooted 
in neoclassical economics and centred on market-led growth.82 The center works in cooperation 
with several major international institutions, including the World Bank and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. Its aims include the formulation of policies for China’s Silk Road strategy, and 
the promotion of China’s entrepreneurial activities in Africa.83 When asked why the Chinese 
government was putting such effort into promoting new-type think tanks, Jiajun Xu, the CNSE’s 
executive deputy director, responded that China “really wants to be perceived on the international 
stage as a stakeholder in this international system and they want to be a positive force behind the 
reforming of the current international financial institutions and any other kinds of global 
governance issues.”84 
 
Rising Alliances of Capital 
Brookings Institute scholar Cheng Li has pointed to an emerging “tripartite elite” of 
overseas trained scholars, internationally connected entrepreneurs, and technocratic officials which 
is coalescing within China’s think tanks, citing the CCIEE, where Justin Lin is a vice chair, as one 
key location where this occurs.85 This powerful cohort may begin to act in its own interests, argues 
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Li. He mentions a well-known case where officials, property developers, bankers, and public 
intellectuals cooperated to further their interests in the real estate market. “Only time will tell,” he 
warns, “whether these fascinating changes in the composition of Chinese think tanks will contribute 
to profound and positive developments in decision-making and elite politics—or whether this new 
confluence of political, economic, and academic elites will spell trouble for China’s near-term 
future.”86 What Li is pointing to is an emerging capitalist class—merged with the global 
technocracy and having policy influence domestically—with a set of interests which, while by no 
means monolithic, is collectively oriented towards promoting forms of capital accumulation. 
This issue has been recognized and debated within China for some time. At stake is the 
potential role of think tanks in either exacerbating, or ameliorating, class divisions which have 
emerged during the reforms. With the language of “class” no longer politically acceptable, the 
debate is usually couched in terms of whether think tanks will be co-opted by “powerful interest 
groups” (qiangshi liyi tuanti), often with reference to the real estate industry, or whether they will, 
on the contrary, speak for the interests of “weak groups” (ruoshi qunti) such as peasants and 
migrant workers. In 2009, for example, Lan Xue and Xufeng Zhu identified a shift occurring in 
China’s political structure from a monopolization of policy making by administrative elites, to its 
monopolization by an alliance of political and corporate elites.87 If unchecked, they argued, think 
tanks would be absorbed into this alliance, impeding their purpose of representing marginalized 
groups.  
Of particular concern are China’s civil think tanks, over which the government has less control. 
With no official restrictions on their private funding allowance, a few civil think tanks have 
attracted large amounts of corporate and foreign funds and, according to one interviewee, are 
outcompeting official think tanks in attracting the best scholars—particularly those trained 
overseas—by offering higher salaries.88 Generally speaking, however, the development of civil 
think tanks is restricted, with statistics from 2013 showing that only 5 percent of Chinese think 
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tanks are civil.89 This is in part due to a law passed in 2005 that required civil think tanks to register 
with the Civil Affairs Bureau and find local affiliation with an official institution, a hurdle that 
many failed to overcome. Many also have difficulty attracting funds, excluded from the government 
funding afforded to official think tanks in a culture which, in fact, does not commonly practice 
corporate or social donations. It has been claimed that, for this reason, civil think tanks are more 
susceptible to being influenced by funders, particularly foreign foundations and transnational 
corporations.90 According to Kaimin Chen, for example, in 2008 the well-known liberal think tank 
the Unirule Institute of Economics accepted over two million Renminbi from overseas sources. This 
carries the risk, argues Chen, that these think tanks may adopt a “Westernized” (xihua) outlook. 
“Some think tanks in China,” Chen observes, “have even completely adopted Western economic 
theories for studying China’s socialist market economy, this should not be ignored.”91  
The debate over civil think tanks is complex, but falls broadly into two camps. Those in the 
first camp argue for cultivating a donor culture to diversify think tanks’ funding sources. Those 
adopting this position are more likely to view the US think tanks system as a model worth 
emulating, pointing, for example, to the established system of regulations and practices in place 
there to prevent monopolization by a particular funding source.92 Yuling Ren, a member of the 
Counsellor Office of the State Council, argues that the reliance of most think tanks on government 
funding stifles their independence, and calls for tax incentives to encourage more corporate 
donations.93 Indeed, as the government makes efforts to stamp out corruption as a channel of policy 
influence, a formalized corporate lobby system may emerge as the preferred alternative.94 Qiao Liu 
advocates the development of a broad donor culture across the whole of society, including public 
interest organizations and individuals, to keep in check the influence of government, corporations, 
and foreign interests, and ensure that less powerful groups will always be represented.95  
Those in the second camp are more sceptical about the “free marketplace of ideas,” and more 
likely to be critical of the US think-tanks system in particular. For example, an article in the 
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Chinese military journal Conmilit warned against the impact of corporate interests on government 
policy making via the funding of think tanks.96 The article draws heavily on an investigative piece 
in the New York Times on the influence of corporations on America’s high-profile think tanks, in 
particular the connections between Brookings and the real estate industry.97 Other scholars argue 
that China’s think-tanks system should be contained within the state apparatus to prevent an 
imbalance of power in favour of any particular interest group. Shaoguang Wang and Peng Fan, for 
example, argue for a model of “centralized ideas and broad interests” (jisi guangyi) in which think 
tanks remain connected to government institutions, while their dispersal across different 
bureaucracies, regions, and levels of government allows for a plurality of concerns to be transmitted 
upwards to the centre through multiple internal channels.98 This would allow, they argue, for 
overall coordination and more equal representation between divergent interests. Yongnian Zheng, a 
Chinese scholar based in Singapore, similarly advocates for a competitive “internal ideas market” 
(neibu sixiang shichang) contained within state institutions to maintain an equal playing field. He 
regards civil think tanks as a necessary supplement since, distant from political power centres, they 
are better able to reflect the concerns of society. However, he argues, as long as they lack the 
institutional and financial advantages of think tanks within the government system, there is no 
danger of them becoming the instruments of powerful lobby groups, as witnessed in America.99  
The Chinese government’s recent moves to hamper the activities of Unirule are reported in 
Anglo-American media accounts as censorship of free speech.100 This is true, yet to understand the 
issue only in such terms is to miss the broader context and significance of China’s evolving class 
politics as the state internationalizes—in particular, the genuine concerns among progressive 
scholars and policy makers about the rising power of global corporate interests within China, which 
major civil think tanks such as Unirule represent. Unirule’s close relationship with the Cato Institute, 
for example, a Washington-based pro-free market think tank well known as a vocal advocate for 
privatizing China’s rural land, is significant in this respect.101  
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 Conclusion  
 In this article, I began by advocating that China’s think tanks be taken seriously on their own 
terms, and analyzed within their particular national political context. This is characterized by 
China’s integration into the global capitalist system, a factor of crucial importance for analyzing 
think tanks, their development, and their role in policy making. Since the 1980s, through increased 
exposure to overseas educational establishments, international institutions, and funding sources, 
particularly those directly engaged with the production and maintenance of the global ideological 
consensus, China’s technocratic policy makers have come to adopt discourses, ideas, and ways of 
thinking compatible with that consensus. In so doing, and through commensurate reforms to its 
economic system and institutions, China has been highly successful at integrating into the global 
capitalist system, manifested by its spectacular economic growth. 
 Through promoting think tanks, China’s leaders are embarking on the next stage in this 
process. They seek to produce a community of highly trained, internationally oriented, globally 
competitive experts and technocrats capable of providing timely and sophisticated analysis and 
advice to relevant government bureaus, and of manoeuvring between the state and international 
institutions to impact policy making at the transnational level. They seek a more powerful voice in 
deliberations about how this global capitalist system is organized, with a view to shaping the global 
ideological consensus and, indeed, a new global order. Yet, at the same time, they endeavour to 
transform China’s institutions and social structure to become compatible with the requirements of 
global capital—thus to internationalize the Chinese state. 
As these processes take place, the cohering of an internationally oriented alliance of wealth, 
knowledge, and political power constituting a powerful emerging capitalist class raises a number of 
issues. First, as think tanks, even under government supervision, become accustomed to receiving 
more of their funding from non-government sources, this will have implications for which interests 
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they serve. Funders may not be able to influence think-tank reports directly, but corporations are 
unlikely to fund think tanks whose research record contradicts their interests. As is the case 
elsewhere in the world, it is hard to see how think tanks promoting workers’ rights, for example, or 
the rights of peasants to their land in the face of incoming agribusinesses, are going to receive the 
same levels of corporate funding as those which promote perspectives considered more compatible 
with the interests of business and the free market. This issue is widely recognized in China as a 
cause for concern and is subject to ongoing contestation in policy circles. Scholars and journalists in 
the West, meanwhile, even despite admirable attempts to escape Anglo-American bias, too often 
continue to view independence as the key criterion for evaluating China’s think tanks, missing the 
significance of these Chinese debates. At stake is how independence—regarded in the traditional 
sense as externality from government and privately funded—may lead to the co-optation of think 
tanks by the forces of capital, both within and outside China, and the resulting social consequences. 
That said, think tanks specializing in different areas will reflect different views. Those affiliated 
to state-owned enterprises will likely advocate differently from those funded by international capital, 
while many think-tank scholars understand their role specifically as speaking for the weak and 
underrepresented. Meanwhile, the debate concerning overseas funding, and what conditions are to 
be attached, is continuing behind the scenes in high-level policy discussions. Some departments, 
such as the Ministry of Defence, are likely to come out against all foreign funding, while civil and 
university think tanks are more likely to be in favour; one interviewee suggested that a block on 
foreign funding would give the misleading impression to outsiders that think tanks were 
government-controlled.102 The question has arisen, moreover, as to what counts as foreign funding, 
with some proposing that donations from foreign corporations owned by overseas Chinese should 
have less restrictions attached.103 Indeed, there is much optimism regarding these organizations as a 
future source of endowments, since they are considered both culturally Chinese, and familiar with a 
practice of philanthropy to which mainland enterprises are not yet accustomed.104  
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Going forward, a number of questions warrant further study. What will be the social 
consequences of increased commercial funding into policy making? Are we witnessing the 
beginnings of a mass corporate lobbying culture in China of the kind that exists in the US? Will the 
establishment of a system of think tanks under government supervision, on the contrary, succeed in 
reining in such vested interests? What are the possibilities for political debate within a think-tanks 
system largely internal to the state apparatus? Or is this system best understood as a form of social 
and political surveillance, which will help to maintain social stability while deferring more 
democratic forms of policymaking? We cannot fully understand the development trajectory of 
China’s new-type think tanks without paying attention to these contested issues. 
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